Trang chủVolleyball2026 National Women's Volleyball Championship: Four Early Tickets and the Silence of Fourteen Rounds
2026 National Women's Volleyball Championship: Four Early Tickets and the Silence of Fourteen Rounds
The electronic scoreboard in the Vinh Long arena flipped for the last time. T...
The electronic scoreboard in the Vinh Long arena flipped for the last time. The final whistle sounded, and for about three seconds nobody in the stands stood up. A young woman in the fifth row, holding a hand-painted cardboard sign bearing the name of a foreign player, slowly folded the sign in half and placed it under her feet, the way one puts down something that has passed its expiry date. On court, the players of the winning team hugged each other. They had just won their first match after twelve consecutive defeats. Their opponent was a side ranked among the title contenders.
I was sitting in the press area, not taking notes. There are evenings when note-taking only adds noise to what is actually happening. Across the court, the bench of the losing team was a long row of jackets nobody took off. Nobody bowed their head. Nobody slammed a hand against the bench. There was only silence, neatly organised, the kind of silence produced by a group that already knows the result and is waiting for the correct procedure to leave.
In the darkness of the press room, I learned to read between the questions.
That night, nobody asked the losing coach why the starting line-up differed from the line-up that had won eight matches in a row. The first question was about spirit. The second was about objectives. The third was about the upcoming semifinal. Three questions, three evasions, and inside those three evasions lay the entire story of the 2026 National Women's Volleyball Championship group stage.
Fourteen rounds instead of seven
The first thing that needs to be stated clearly, because many people are arguing without knowing the original number: the 2026 group-stage format is not the same as in previous seasons. In previous seasons the group stage was a single round robin, seven matches per team. In 2026 the federation switched to a double round robin, fourteen matches per team. The number of matches doubled exactly.
That number looks like good news at first glance. More matches means more opportunities for young teams, more matches for spectators, more data for professionals. A tournament that wants to grow must have more matches. No competition has ever matured by playing less.
But a format is a machine for generating situations, and that machine was not designed to generate attractiveness. It was designed to generate fairness. The two do not always travel together.
When every team plays fourteen matches and four teams advance, the mathematics very quickly points to one thing: given the current competitive spread in domestic women's volleyball, the four semifinal places were practically settled before the group stage had completed two-thirds of its distance. And that is exactly what happened. Four teams secured their tickets with four rounds to spare.
Let that number settle for a moment. Four rounds early, out of fourteen. That means that for the four strongest teams, nearly a third of the group stage had become matches with no sporting consequence. Win or lose, the ranking might shift up or down, but the ticket was already in the pocket.
Four early tickets
That group of four, according to what the group stage showed, consisted of HCDG Lao Cai, VTV Binh Dien Long An, Binh Chung Thong Tin and Ha Noi. Behind them came XMLS Thanh Hoa, Geleximco Hung Yen and the rest of the field.
That structure is itself a statement about the general level of the tournament. Four teams separating early is not because they were far better than they had been in previous seasons, but because the gap between the leading group and the middle of the table is now wider than fourteen rounds can close. A tournament in which four teams fight each other and three others play to fulfil an obligation is a tournament with a structural problem, not an attitude problem among the players.
What is worth noting is that the organisers actively expanded the format. That is a sign of ambition. A federation does not expand a tournament unless it believes the tournament has a future. But ambition about the number of matches and ambition about the quality of matches are two different things, and between them lies a gap nobody filled.
That gap is precisely what spectators describe with a very heavy word: calculation.
The curve of Ha Noi
If I had to choose a single data point to tell the story of this group stage, I would choose the curve of Ha Noi.
Over their first eight matches they were unbeaten. That is the run of a team playing at the right rhythm, with the right people, according to the right intentions. Then over their last six matches they lost five. And the most inexplicable defeat was the one against a team that had lost all twelve of its previous matches. In the standings, Ha Noi went from first to fourth.
I sat with that number for a long time. From first to fourth within six matches is a level of fluctuation one normally sees only in a team in genuine crisis: mass injuries, internal rupture, or a technical loss of form. Yet there was no sign of any of those three causes. There was no information about mass injuries. There was not a word about internal rupture. And most importantly, the collapse coincides in time with the moment the ticket was secured.
Coincidence in timing is not proof. But in sports analysis, when two curves converge at exactly one point, one is obliged to hypothesise that they are connected.
The most economical explanation, and the one I believe most, is that once the semifinal place was secure, the Ha Noi coaching staff deliberately reduced the load on key players and gave playing time to the second unit. That is a rational decision in terms of load management across a fourteen-round tournament. It only becomes a problem when the second unit is not strong enough to hold results, and when spectators have paid to watch a match in which the team is no longer trying at maximum.
Reading a 3-1 scoreline
There is a small detail in the scoreline that I think many people skim past: Ha Noi lost 1-3, not 0-3.
If a team throws a match completely, the scoreline tends to be 0-3 with three lopsided sets. Winning one set in a losing match says the line-up on court still had players capable of producing points, still had organisation, but not enough to sustain it across four sets. That is the signature of a partially rotated line-up, not of a forfeited line-up.
The distinction matters enormously, because the two are different in moral substance. Rotation is a coach's right and standard practice in every league in the world. Throwing a match is something else entirely, and I see no evidence of it here.
But there is something the defenders of rotation often overlook: to the spectator in the stands, a partially rotated line-up and a forfeited line-up feel almost identical. They do not see the load-management spreadsheet. They see a player they waited a month for and who is not on court.
Mihajlovic and the shadow of a star
And that is precisely the case of Brankica Mihajlovic.
The Serbian player won the world championship in 2026 in the colours of the Serbia national team. A world champion playing in a domestic national championship is a very notable signal about the recruitment capacity of Vietnamese women's volleyball. It says the league has enough pull to invite names above the regional average.
According to what the group stage showed, Mihajlovic shone almost exclusively in the match against Binh Chung Thong Tin, and afterwards largely disappeared from the picture. Spectators came to the arena waiting for her, and did not see her.
I do not want to move past this detail quickly, because it is where two stories meet. The first is a professional story: a team that depends too heavily on a single attacking outlet loses its weight when that outlet is not on court or has been read by the opponent. The second is a story about the relationship with the audience: when you promote a star, you create a promise. And a promise must be kept, even when keeping it is not tactically optimal.
No data in my possession allows me to distinguish between four possibilities left open: deliberate rest, a dip in form, a minor injury, or being tightly marked to plan. All four could be true. And the fact that all four could be true is precisely why we should be careful with conclusions of the kind that say she was being hidden.
The technical cost nobody measures
This is the part I want to spend the most time on, because it is the part left empty in almost every commentary on this year's tournament.
When a team rotates, what is lost is not a name. What is lost are the things that do not appear on the scoreboard.
The first is the reception system. Bringing in a reserve passer does not simply replace one person; it changes the entire division of passing zones and the way the team reads the opponent's serve direction. A reception system built over months cannot maintain its quality through a substitution. When first contact wobbles, the setter is forced to set further off the net, and every downstream attacking option drops one level.
The second is the understanding between setter and hitters. This is the thing that takes longest to build and shortest to break. A quick combination at position three requires the setter to know exactly where her hitter will take off, how high she jumps, whether she prefers a high or low ball. Changing personnel, even in one position, resets part of that equation.
The third is the rhythm of the double block. Blocking is not jumping high. Blocking is reading. A well-drilled blocking pair moves in the same rhythm, dividing responsibility according to what they detect in the opposing setter's hand position. Bring in a new player and the pair loses part of its shared reading, and that never appears in any statistical table.
I stress these three points because I know someone will say: rotation still means eleven players on court, what difference does it make. It makes a great deal of difference. And that difference is why the final rounds of the group stage looked like a different sport.
But here I must be honest about my own limits. Everything I have just written is inference from structure, not from data. The original commentary I am analysing provides not a single technical indicator: no spike success rate, no attack efficiency, no blocks per set, no ace-to-error ratio, no perfect pass percentage.
Without those numbers, nobody can issue a verdict on the technical quality of the tournament. The claim that the group stage's professional quality was not high is an impression, not a measured finding. And I think the original author understood this; they chose to analyse behaviour and format rather than technique, and that was an honest choice.
What I would add is this: the data to answer the question certainly exists. Every match is recorded in dedicated statistical software, and federation records contain full starting line-ups for every match. A single round-by-round line-up comparison would immediately separate strategic rest from genuine collapse. That table is not published, and so the story remains in the realm of emotional argument.
Lao Cai rotated and still topped the table
In that picture, HCDG Lao Cai is the only team that did something the others could not: they also rotated their line-up at various points, yet held first place.
That difference deserves a pause. If rotation always led to collapse, Lao Cai would have collapsed. They did not. Which means the problem is not rotation itself, but the depth of the reserve force.
A team with a good second unit can rotate without losing results. A team with a thin second unit pays immediately. The same strategic decision, two different outcomes, and the difference is measured by the quality of the people rather than by the coach's intentions.
This is the point I consider more important than the whole calculation narrative: this year's tournament accidentally published a depth audit of every strong team. And the audit produced very uneven results.
VTV Binh Dien Long An also did not use its strongest line-up in the remaining matches. That is standard practice. What is worth noting is how differently the teams handled the communication around that decision. Some said it in advance. Some said nothing. And silence, in this case, is read by spectators in the least favourable way.
Their silence was not agreement; it was a statement.
The bench as a mirror
There is something I always look for in the matches I follow, and it is not on the court. It is the bench.
In a team with depth, the bench is the loudest place in the arena. The substitute understands her role, knows when she will go in, knows what she has to do in the three minutes she is on court. In a thin team, the bench is the quietest place. People sit there and wait, and nobody tells them how long they will wait.
In the final rounds, the bench of a team in crisis looked very different from the bench of the team leading the table. Not because anyone was happier. Because on the leading team, the substitute knew she was part of a plan. On the struggling team, the substitute knew she was a reactive contingency.
Those quiet women do not need glory; they need a society that knows how to look.
And if we look more closely, Ha Noi's second-unit story is not the story of a coach who miscalculated. It is the story of a development system that has not produced enough people for a team to rest its key players without fearing defeat. When you have eight players good enough to start and four who are only good enough to enter once the match is decided, then every rotation decision is a trade between two risks.
That is why I do not want this story to end with criticism of one individual. Coach Nguyen Tuan Kiet rotated the Ha Noi line-up continuously, and he is responsible for the results. But responsibility for why the second unit could not hold results belongs to another level, higher up and further away than a single season.
The 1v4 semifinal rule and the reward for those who calculate
Now comes the format question that I consider the technical crux of the whole story.
Under the tournament regulations, the semifinals are paired on the principle of first against fourth, second against third. It sounds very reasonable. It is the common pairing method in most leagues in the world, and it rewards the team with the better record with a theoretically easier opponent.
But look at the consequence few people state aloud: when finishing second or third can lead to a more favourable half of the bracket than finishing first, then table position becomes a strategic variable. And when a variable
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