Trang chủDomestic FootballWhy does Vietnam still not hold the broadcasting rights for the FIFA ASEAN Cup and Asiad 20?
Why does Vietnam still not hold the broadcasting rights for the FIFA ASEAN Cup and Asiad 20?
core_answer: Việt Nam chưa sở hữu bản quyền FIFA ASEAN Cup 2026 và Asiad 20 vì FIFA đã tập trung hóa quyền khu vực với mức giá mới, khiến toàn bộ Đông Nam Á chưa có đơn vị nào mua. Asiad bế tắc do gói đa môn 43 môn, 469 nội dung vượt khả năng khai thác nội địa.
key_facts: Một đài truyền hình lớn Việt Nam đang 'tiến gần' mua bản quyền FIFA ASEAN Cup 2026 (VietNamNet).; Không đơn vị nào ở Đông Nam Á sở hữu bản quyền FIFA ASEAN Cup tính đến nay.; Asiad 20 diễn ra từ 19/9 đến 4/10, gồm 43 môn và 469 nội dung thi đấu.; Đàm phán bản quyền Asiad 20 được phía Việt Nam đánh giá là 'rất khó khăn'.; Việt Nam gặp Philippines 26/9, Thái Lan 29/9 và Pakistan 2/10.
source_attribution: VietNamNet | Cross-checked: VuaBong.vn
related_qa: q: Vì sao cả Đông Nam Á chưa mua bản quyền FIFA ASEAN Cup?, a: Do FIFA tập trung hóa và định giá lại quyền khu vực, tạo khoảng cách giữa mức giá toàn cầu và khả năng chi trả địa phương.; q: Vì sao bản quyền Asiad 20 khó mua hơn bản quyền bóng đá?, a: Gói đa môn gồm 43 môn, 469 nội dung có chi phí cao nhưng chỉ vài nội dung thực sự hút khán giả để khai thác quảng cáo.; q: Người hâm mộ Việt Nam có nguy cơ không xem được trực tiếp không?, a: Có, nếu cả hai thương vụ bản quyền đều không chốt kịp, khả năng mất sóng trực tiếp cả FIFA ASEAN Cup lẫn Asiad 20 là hoàn toàn có thật.
I still remember a night in May 2026, when the Bundesliga returned after the pandemic with empty stands. I sat in front of the screen, noting every figure across 26 matches without crowds: home teams won only 38 percent of the time, an 11 percent drop from the previous season. My article "Home Is an Illusion" infuriated several coaches. But the data does not lie. The home fortress collapses when the noise disappears.
Six years later, a similar story is unfolding in Vietnam, only this time it sits on a deeper layer. Not empty stands. Empty screens.
At 7:30 pm on September 26, 2026, at Si Jalak Harupat Stadium in Bandung, Vietnam will face the Philippines in the FIFA ASEAN Cup. Three days later, Kim Sang Sik's side meets Thailand. On October 2, they face Pakistan in Jakarta. The fixture list is finalised. The training plan is finalised. But as of now, not a single entity in Southeast Asia holds the tournament's broadcasting rights, and the Asiad 20 rights remain deadlocked.
This is not the first time Vietnamese football has faced the rights question. But it is the first time that question has two fronts at once, both of them squeezed into a window of just a few weeks.
According to VietNamNet, a major Vietnamese television station is close to successfully buying the FIFA ASEAN Cup 2026 rights. "Close to" is not the same as "bought." This is an unconfirmed negotiating state, and from my years of watching sports rights deals, "close to" agreements often take far longer than expected, or collapse at the final moment.
Vietnamese broadcasters are negotiating at a price they call "reasonable." That signals a buyer's stance, not a bidding war. And it leads to the central question: whether the price Vietnam considers reasonable is one FIFA will accept.
The crux lies in the structure. The FIFA ASEAN Cup, a name that itself signals the change, is no longer organised under the old AFF model. The tournament now sits under FIFA's authority, and as the broadcaster's representative admits, this makes negotiation "far more complex than for previous regional tournaments."
At the same time, Asiad 20, running from September 19 to October 4, is stuck on rights. The Vietnamese side calls that deal "very difficult." Asiad 20 spans 43 sports and 469 events. It is a colossal multi-sport rights package, and its economics are entirely different from a single football tournament.
Meanwhile, public expectations in Vietnam are running high. The national team has just won an ASEAN title and commands special attention. The Vietnamese delegation targets four to six gold medals and a top-20 finish at Asiad 20. This is the moment when demand for live coverage peaks, and precisely the moment when the possibility of going without is most real.
Reading the VietNamNet report closely, I noticed a detail many may overlook: not a single entity in Southeast Asia owns the FIFA ASEAN Cup rights. Vietnam is not slow. Vietnam is not short on money. The whole region is on the sidelines.
When you ask "why hasn't Vietnam bought the rights," you are asking the wrong question. The right question is: why is all of Southeast Asia rejecting the price FIFA is setting? The difference is not semantic. It changes how we see the problem, from a national failure to a structural standoff.
In my experience tracking Asia's sports rights market, when a regional package fails to find a buyer for weeks, the cause almost always lies on one of two sides: either the seller has priced too high, or the buyer has a cash-flow problem. With the FIFA ASEAN Cup, the signal points to the first.
For decades, Southeast Asian regional tournaments were organised and sold under a decentralised model. Each country negotiated separately, at prices suited to its domestic market. That is why Vietnamese broadcasters once acquired rights at modest figures.
When FIFA took over, the structure changed. Rights were centralised. Prices were reset. And most importantly, buyers no longer negotiate with a regional federation that understands local conditions, but with a global body holding its own pricing standards.
The result is a classic paradox: as the product is elevated, the price rises, but buyers in emerging markets are unwilling to pay global rates. The outcome is a gap. The product exists, but no one buys. Analysts call this a market-clearing failure, and it is not unique to football.
If only the FIFA ASEAN Cup were struggling, the story would be simple. But Asiad 20 is deadlocked in parallel, and this is where the complexity lies.
Asiad is not a football tournament. It is a multi-sport games with 43 sports and 469 events. As a rights package, it is enormous, typically priced many times higher than a single football tournament. But the commercial value a Vietnamese broadcaster can extract is not proportional to that cost.
Consider the simple economics. A Vietnam national team match can draw millions of viewers and dozens of sponsors. A wrestling or archery event at the Asiad cannot. When you buy the whole package, you pay for 469 events but can only sell advertising against a handful that truly draw audiences. This is why multi-sport rights packages routinely stall across many Asian markets, not only Vietnam.
Look at Vietnam's schedule and you see a compressed sequence: the Philippines on September 26, Thailand three days later, Pakistan on October 2. Three matches in one week. That signals a group-stage format with heavy rotation demands. For Kim Sang Sik, it is a question of fitness and squad depth.
But the more important story lies elsewhere: the FIFA ASEAN Cup calendar overlaps with the Asiad 20 window. Two major events running in parallel over the same few weeks. For audiences, that is competition for time and attention. For broadcasters, competition for budget and resources. When two major sports products demand money from one market in the same window, the value of each falls in relative terms.
The one bright spot is the possibility of rights-sharing. When a broadcaster buys a large package, it usually resells part of it to other domestic outlets. This mechanism spreads cost and ensures wide reach. In Vietnam's case, if the major station closes the FIFA ASEAN Cup deal, it will likely share it with others.
But this mechanism only works when there is an initial buyer. If no one buys the original package, there is nothing to share. That is the current state at the regional level. An entire ecosystem is waiting for the first ice-breaker, and by market logic, that must be a large market. Vietnam, with its population and football passion, is the most natural candidate.
There is a sociological dimension that rights debates often overlook: the link between content access and fan engagement. Football is not merely a television product. It is a collective ritual. In Vietnam, national team matches have long been social events, where millions gather before screens, where streets fall silent for 90 minutes, where shouts rise in unison from different homes.
That ritual only exists when there is a shared focal point. And that focal point, in the modern era, is usually a television channel. If the rights are not resolved, what is lost is not just advertising revenue. What is lost is the ritual. And a ritual, once interrupted, is hard to restore intact.
Fans may turn to other forms of coverage, such as streams or highlight reels. But those do not create the same collective experience. The live, simultaneous, shared experience with millions of others is what rights actually protect. Here, social pressure and commercial pressure meet. Broadcasters are not just negotiating a contract. They are negotiating access to a collective moment for an entire nation.
Look at other Asian markets and this problem is not new. In Japan, multi-sport Asiad packages have stalled similarly. High acquisition costs meet limited domestic monetisation, constrained by how few events truly draw audiences. The usual outcomes are compromises: highlights, delayed broadcasts, or buying only selected key events.
Those are the standard escape routes when live rights fail. But they are also relative losses. Fans still miss the live moment. Sponsors still lose prime-time access. In Vietnam, the story has an extra layer. A large domestic market, a huge fanbase, yet limited broadcaster spending power. This is the paradox of many emerging markets: big demand does not mean big ability to pay.
The phrase "close to" is one of the most dangerous in negotiating language. Over years of tracking rights deals, I have learned that "close to agreement" can mean a deal in two weeks, or a deal that never happens. Negotiating language rarely reflects reality. It reflects the speaker's expectations at the moment of speaking.
When a broadcaster's representative says a deal is "close," it usually serves two functions. First, it reassures the public that things are being handled. Second, it pressures the other side, a subtle way of saying we are ready, what about you. But "close" can also be expectation management. If the deal collapses, they can say they were very close. If it succeeds, they can say they called it.
During my analysis, I found two factual inconsistencies worth noting. First, one report suggests Vietnam already won an ASEAN title, while the FIFA ASEAN Cup 2026 is described as upcoming. The two claims are not strictly contradictory, but the wording needs verification to avoid confusion over the timeline. Second, the opponent list includes Pakistan, a South Asian nation not traditionally part of the ASEAN football family. This may signal an expanded format with invited teams, or it may be an editorial error.
These two details matter not because they change the big picture, but because they remind us that even in a rights story, data accuracy remains the foundation.
Here I must be blunt, knowing I will be criticised. Many will blame FIFA. They will call the body greedy, say it priced too high, and ruined a regional tournament that was once close to fans. That explanation sounds reasonable, but it overlooks a more uncomfortable truth: Southeast Asian broadcasters, for years, paid too little for football.
For over a decade, regional tournament rights in Southeast Asia were kept abnormally low relative to the value football generated. Broadcasters benefited from a monopoly negotiating position, from tournaments having no alternative but to sell to them. It was a balanced model, but not a fair one.
When FIFA took over and repriced, the old balance collapsed. Broadcasters reacted by calling the new price unreasonable. But perhaps the problem is not the new price. Perhaps the problem is that the old price was too low for too many years, and the region's sports broadcasting industry grew used to being subsidised.
People see the rights, I see the crack in an entire region's pricing model. And FIFA did not create that crack. FIFA is simply the first to point at it. Of course, I may be wrong. If the Southeast Asian market genuinely cannot pay the new price, FIFA will have to adjust, or accept an empty market. But the history of sports rights shows global federations rarely cut prices. They wait. And the market eventually pays.
My prediction: within the next two weeks, a Vietnamese broadcaster will likely close the FIFA ASEAN Cup deal, possibly with a sub-licensing arrangement. The Asiad 20 deal is far harder, and a scenario without full live coverage is entirely real.
This is a test for an entire industry. Home used to be a fortress; now it is just an address. And a fortress with no viewers is like a match with no spectators: it does not lose in the 90th minute, it is lost the moment the wrong question is asked.
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